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 ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	C-01	DODE-00	EUR-01	HA-09
H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
OMB-01	PA-01	PM-01	PRS-01	P-01	SNP-01	SP-01
SS-01	TRSE-00	T-01	USIE-00	/027W		
-----661162 250745Z /38						

R 250737Z SEP 92  
 FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8969  
 INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
 AMEMBASSY BAMAKO  
 AMEMBASSY BONN  
 AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  
 AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA  
 AMEMBASSY DAKAR  
 AMEMBASSY HARARE  
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 AMEMBASSY LONDON  
 AMEMBASSY NAIROBI  
 AMEMBASSY PARIS  
 USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE //ECPLAD//

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAR ES SALAAM 05577

BONN FOR KLEMP, BRUSSELS FOR DUBROW, LONDON FOR  
 MCKINLEY, PARIS FOR PERLOW

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STATE FOR AF/RA, AF/E, AF/C, AF/S

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR  
 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MARR, OAU, RW, TZ  
 SUBJECT: ARUSHA III - SOME THOUGHTS ON THE DYNAMICS OF  
 - THE TALKS

REF: A) KIGALI 03782  
 - B) DAR ES SALAAM 05355 AND PREVIOUS

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1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. THOUGH IT IS EARLY TO TRY TO JUDGE THE OUTCOME OF THE RWANDA NEGOTIATIONS, IT IS POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE SOME PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ABOUT THE DYNAMICS, BOTH POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL, AFFECTING THE PEACE PROCESS IN ARUSHA. THIS CABLE DOES NOT PRETEND TO BE A DEFINITIVE ANALYSIS, BUT IS A CONTRIBUTION BASED ON THE LIMITED PERSPECTIVE AVAILABLE TO THE U.S.

OBSERVERS DURING THE ARUSHA III ROUND, WHICH ENDED SEPTEMBER 18. THE NEGOTIATIONS SO FAR HAVE BEEN MARKED BY THE SUSPICIOUSNESS OF THE RPF TOWARDS THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA. THE GOR TEAM, ON ITS SIDE, IS CLEARLY NEGOTIATING AMIDST DIVIDED COUNCILS, WITH AT LEAST PART OF THE GOR COALITION SEEING THESE TALKS AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO EITHER CLIP PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA'S WINGS OR GET RID OF HIM ALTOGETHER. BOTH SIDES NEED ASSISTANCE IN OVERCOMING THEIR OWN FEARS AND UNCERTAINTIES TO REACH A SETTLEMENT.

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THE GOR SIDE

4. TWO MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S OFFER TO THE RPF ARE TO MAKE THE PEACE AGREEMENT SUPREME OVER THE EXISTING CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, AND TO REDUCE HABYARIMANA TO THE STATUS OF A FIRST AMONG EQUALS IN A CABINET COUNCIL THAT WOULD HAVE THE ABILITY TO RESTRAIN OR PREVENT HIM FROM EXERCISING POWER UNILATERALLY. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THIS IS A GOAL SHARED BY THE RPF AND THE RWANDAN INTERNAL OPPOSITION; IT IS NOT AT ALL CLEAR THAT PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA IS NOW WILLING TO ACCEPT STRICT LIMITS ON HIS AUTHORITY. THE RPF ITSELF HAS ESTABLISHED LINKS TO RWANDAN OPPOSITION LEADERS WHO ARE EVIDENTLY ENCOURAGING THE RPF TO HOLD OUT FOR SOME KIND OF PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL THAT WILL EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVE HABYARIMANA OF POWER.

5. GOR FONMIN NGULINZIRA, BY MAKING A REASONABLE OFFER (AFTER SEVERAL DAYS DELAY), SEIZED THE HIGH GROUND, LEAVING IT TO THE RPF TO TRY TO EXPLAIN WHY THE OFFER WAS UNSATISFACTORY. OBSERVER OPINION TENDED TO SIDE WITH THE GOR ONCE ITS OFFER WAS ON THE TABLE; IT WAS DETAILED, IT WAS SPECIFIC, AND IT WAS

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GENEROUS. THE GOR APPROACH APPEARED TO BE DESIGNED TO DEVELOP A BROAD TRANSITION PROCESS TO DEMOCRATIC REFORM, AND OFFER SPECIFIC WAYS TO INCLUDE THE RPF IN THAT PROCESS. FONMIN NGULINZIRA, WHO AT ARUSHA II HAD APPEARED TO BE KEPT IN CHECK BY THE MRND MEMBERS OF THE GOR TEAM, AT ARUSHA III SEEMED TO HAVE GREATER LATITUDE TO MAKE CONCESSIONARY PROPOSALS.

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THE RPF SIDE

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6. THE RPF BROUGHT TO THE TABLE ALL THE CLASSIC STIGMATA OF OPEN MISTRUST, INSECURITY AND SELF-PITY TO BE EXPECTED OF AN EXILE MOVEMENT REPRESENTING A POPULATION WHICH HAS SUFFERED THROUGH A HISTORY OF REJECTION, WAR AND ISOLATION. THE BANYARWANDA EXILES HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO GAIN ACCEPTANCE OR TO ASSIMILATE IN THOSE COUNTRIES TO WHICH THEY FLED, AND HAVE ABSORBED AS LEADERS A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO FEEL A

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FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM  
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INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 DAR ES SALAAM 05577

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SUBJECT: ARUSHA III - SOME THOUGHTS ON THE DYNAMICS OF  
- THE TALKS

DIRECT AND PERSONAL SENSE OF GRIEVANCE AGAINST  
PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA. THE RPF LEADERSHIP HAS THUS  
DEVELOPED A LIVELY PERSECUTION COMPLEX WHICH ENSURES  
THAT THE GOR OFFERS ARE VIEWED WITH THE DEEPEST  
SUSPICION. HENCE THE RPF'S INSISTENCE ON CREATING NEW  
GOVERNMENT BODIES, ABOVE AND OUTSIDE EXISTING  
STRUCTURES, WHICH WILL HAVE TOTAL POWER OVER THE  
TRANSITION PROCESS. THE RPF SEES THIS APPROACH AS  
NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT THE TRANSITION IS NOT  
DERAILED OR TURNED AGAINST THEM. RPF NEGOTIATORS  
ASSERT THAT THE MINISTERS IN THE COALITION CABINET ARE  
POWERLESS BECAUSE THEY HAVE NO CONTROL OVER THE  
ACTIONS OF THE SECURITY FORCES, WHICH RESPOND ONLY TO  
THE PRESIDENT. IN PROPOSING TO STRIP HABYARIMANA OF

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HIS POWER, THEY CLAIM THEY ARE ONLY PURSUING THE OPPOSITION PARTIES' AGENDA. BUT THEIR DEMAND MUST ALSO INCREASE CONCERNS IN THE VARIOUS GOR CAMPS THAT THE RPF IS SEEKING A DECISIVE MEASURE OF POWER IN ORDER TO REVERSE THE RESULTS OF THE POST-INDEPENDENCE UPHEAVALS.

MULTIPLE INSECURITIES

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7. DRIVING THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD IS THE SHARED PERCEPTION OF ALL THE PARTIES -- NON-RWANDAN ACTORS INCLUDED -- THAT THE CURRENT POLITICAL-MILITARY STALEMATE IS DANGEROUS FOR BOTH SIDES. FOR THE BANYARWANDA EXILES THERE IS THE THREAT OF LOSING THEIR SUPPORT FROM UGANDA, WHICH WOULD CRIPPLE THEIR ABILITY TO PRESS THE REGIME. AND IN THE EVENT OF FAILURE, THEIR SITUATION IN UGANDA COULD WELL WORSEN. THE GOVERNMENT FACES DECLINING MORALE AND EFFECTIVENESS IN THE ARMY, GROWING OPPOSITION POLITICAL STRENGTH, AND SIGNS OF ETHNIC RESTIVENESS. THE RECENT VIOLENCE IN KIBUYE OFFERS A DISTURBING GLIMPSE OF THE POSSIBLE FUTURE UNLESS WAYS CAN BE FOUND OF ACCOMMODATING THE EXILES WITHOUT SETTING OFF A HUTU EXTREMIST REACTION. THE DETERIORATION OF THE GOVERNMENT'S INTERNAL COHESION DOES NOT NECESSARILY DO THE RPF ANY GOOD, SINCE A LOSS OF CONTROL AT THE CENTER MIGHT PRODUCE A REPEAT OF THE POST-INDEPENDENCE ETHNIC CATASTROPHES. FINALLY, PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA, HIS FAMILY AND SUPPORTERS MUST BE DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THE THREAT OF LOSING POLITICAL CONTROL, AND THE PROSPECT THAT THEIR ENEMIES MAY AT SOME POINT GAIN POWER OVER THEM.

THE STAKES

8. THE ALTERNATIVES TO A SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION ARE BLEAK. GIVEN THE STRENGTH OF EXISTING TENSIONS, EACH FACTION ACTING ALONE IS PROBABLY CAPABLE OF SETTING THE ENTIRE COUNTRY ON FIRE. THEY ARE ENGAGED IN A

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JOINT HIGH-WIRE ACT, WITH A PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO A  
MORE DEMOCRATIC ORDER AS THE GOAL. EITHER A REVERSION  
TO REPRESSION BY THE REGIME, A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN  
HABYARIMANA AND HIS DOMESTIC OPPONENTS, OR ANOTHER  
RESORT TO THE BATTLEFIELD BY THE REBELS COULD TIP  
RWANDA INTO THE DOWNWARD SPIRAL OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC  
AND SOCIAL COLLAPSE THAT WE HAVE SEEN ELSEWHERE. ALL  
OF THE PARTIES NEED TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE WAY TO  
ENSURE THEIR NIGHTMARES DO NOT MATERIALIZE IS TO  
PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS TO A PEACEFUL CONCLUSION. THE  
EXILES NEED TO KNOW THAT THEY CAN GO HOME (OR BE  
PERMANENTLY RESETTLED) IN PEACE AND SECURITY AND WITH  
REASONABLE PROSPECTS FOR A DECENT FUTURE. THE  
INTERNAL OPPOSITION NEEDS TO FEEL THAT IT CAN CONDUCT

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ITS CAMPAIGN FOR A PEACEFUL TRANSITION WITHOUT FEAR OF ETHNIC OUTBURSTS OR REPRESSIVE BEHAVIOR BY THE REGIME. PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA AND HIS SUPPORTERS ALSO NEED SOME GUARANTEES OF THEIR OWN FUTURE, THAT THE DIMINUTION OF THEIR POWER WILL NOT TRANSLATE INTO THEIR PUBLIC HUMILIATION OR CHASTISEMENT AT THE HANDS OF THEIR POLITICAL ENEMIES.

THE OBSERVERS

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9. THE OBSERVERS HAVE PLAYED A KEY ROLE THROUGHOUT THE TALKS IN REMINDING THE PARTIES TO STAY FOCUSED ON THE NEED TO ATTAIN A SETTLEMENT, AND TO MAKE THE REQUIRED CONCESSIONS. DURING ARUSHA III THE OBSERVERS WERE ACTIVE IN PRESSING BOTH SIDES TO MAKE SERIOUS PROPOSALS AND TO LOOK CAREFULLY AT THE OTHER SIDE'S. THE OBSERVERS ALSO PRESSED THE PARTIES TO IDENTIFY THOSE AREAS WHERE THEY HAD REACHED AGREEMENT. IT IS LIKELY THAT AS THE NEGOTIATIONS PROGRESS, TWO SIDES WHICH TRUST EACH OTHER SO LITTLE WILL HAVE TO TURN TO THIRD-PARTY GUARANTORS TO MAKE AN AGREEMENT WORK. BY COMMITTING THEMSELVES EARLY TO UPHOLD THE

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IMPLEMENTATION OF A PEACE AGREEMENT AND A TRANSITION  
PROCESS, THE OBSERVERS MAY BE ABLE TO SMOOTH THE PATH  
TO A SETTLEMENT BY SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCING THE FEELINGS  
OF INSECURITY AND UNCERTAINTY AFFECTING BOTH SIDES.

10. IN ADDITION, TO BUILD THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS FOR  
AGREEMENT THE GOR AND THE RPF NEED TO SPEAK TO EACH  
OTHER IN LANGUAGE THAT IS FREE OF CANT, OF CALLS FOR  
VENGEANCE, AND DOES NOT CONSTANTLY REAWAKEN THE  
MEMORIES OF PAST INJURIES. BOTH SIDES NEED TO SPEAK  
IN TERMS OF RECONCILIATION, OF HEALING, AND OF  
ENSURING TO EACH OTHER A PEACEFUL RWANDA IN WHICH ALL  
WILL HAVE A FUTURE. BOTH NEED TO STOP USING THEIR  
NEGOTIATIONS AS OPPORTUNITIES TO SCORE POINTS OFF EACH  
OTHER; THEY MUST BE CONSTANTLY REMINDED THAT THE GOAL  
IS A PEACE AGREEMENT, NOT WINNING A DEBATE.

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